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L Introduction
The evolution of business organization law in recent years is striking.
Traditionally, lawyers could consistently rely on certain categorical norms.
For example, a clear difference existed between general partnerships and
limited partnerships.' Partners in general partnerships faced unlimited personal liability for partnership obligations and were expected to participate in
firm management.2 Alternatively, limited partnerships offered limited liability
for those partners who had little desire to participate in firm management.3
Such stark formal differences made application of federal securities law4 to
partnership interests relatively simple.5
Although federal securities law does not specifically mention partnership
interests in the definition of a "security," courts and commentators agree that
partnership interests should be analyzed as investment contracts, a term
included in the definition of a "security."6 In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,7 the
Supreme Court announced an investment contract test that required profits to
be derived from the "efforts of others."8 Building on Howey's "efforts of
1. Compare UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1914) § 15 [hereinafter UPA] (providing that
partners arejointly and severally liable for another partner's wrongful act or breach of trust and
jointly liable for all other partnership obligations) with UNIF. LIMITEDPARTNERSHIPACT (1916)
§ 7 [hereinafter ULPA] (providing limited liability for limited partners unless they participate
in control of business).
2. See RICHARDA. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW § 14.2, at 429 (5th ed. 1998)
(suggesting that unlimited personal liability for partnership obligations encourages each partner
to participate in firm management).
3. See Comment, The Limited Partnership,45 YALE L.J. 895, 904-05 (1936) (discussing extent to which limited partners expect to participate in firm management).
4. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-z (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(u) (1994).
5. See infra Part II.B. 1 & 2 (discussing traditional treatment of general and limited
partnership interests under securities law).
6. See Conrad E.J. Everhard, The Limited PartnershipInterest: Is It a Security?
Changing Times, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 441, 444 (1992) (discussing treatment of partnership
interests under federal securities law).
7. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
8. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,301 (1946) (concluding that interests in
question are investment contracts and thus securities). In Howey, the Supreme Court created
a test for determining when an investment is an "investment contract" under the federal
securities laws. Id. The investors in Howey purchased small tracts of citrus groves consisting
of individual rows or portions thereof. Id. at 295. A single row of forty-eight trees constituted
one acre, and thirty-one of the forty-two investors bought less than five acres. Id. In addition
to a land sales contract, most investors also purchased a service contract from Howey Co. that
gave the company full discretion and authority over cultivation, harvesting, and marketing of
the investors' crops, with net profits later distributed to the investors. Id. at 296. Most of the
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others" test, lower federal courts developed presumptions that general partnership interests are not securities and that limited partnership interests are
securities.9 These presumptions rely on traditional notions of the roles that
general and limited partners play within their respective firms.10
Recent changes in partnership law have uprooted traditional notions of
partnership, causing a blurring of the lines and a collision of categories so that
traditional presumptions no longer provide sufficient analytical tools when
decidingwhetherpartnership interests are securities. Generalpartnership law
no longer guarantees general partners enough control over partnership affairs
to protect their investment." Statutory norms no longer restrict limited
partners to merely passive roles.12 Moreover, the development of limited
liability partnerships (LLPs) effectively eliminates the traditional tradeoff
between partnership control and limited liability.' 3 This Note considers
whether changes to partnership law and the development ofLLPs should alter
the effect of federal securities law on partnership interests.
In Part II, this Note discusses the traditional application of federal
securities law on general and limited partnership interests. Part III provides
a lengthy but necessary discussion of the changes in modem partnership law
that make traditional form-based presumptions less reliable. Specifically, Part
III discusses the increased freedom of contract available under the Revised
Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) and explains how this freedom enables
partnerships to create strong centralized management and stripped general
investors were professionals who lacked the "knowledge, skill and equipment necessary for the
care and cultivation of citrus trees." Id. Taking the position that substance prevails over form,
the Howey Court held that the land sales contract and the service contract taken together
constituted investment contracts under the securities laws. Id. at 299. In reaching its conclusion, the Court held that an investment contract exists when there is an investment of money in
a common enterprise with an expectation of profit to be derived solely through the efforts of
others. Id. at 301. See infra Part II (discussing traditional treatment of general and limited
partnership interests under federal securities law).
9. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that general
partnership interests presumptively are not securities); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41
(9th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that limited partnership interests presumptively are securities).
10. See Michael J. Garrison & Terry W. Knoepfle, Limited Liability Company Interests
as Securities: A ProposedFrameworkforAnalysis, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 577, 617 (1996) (stating
that general partnership interests are usually not securities because owners are active participants who directly control partnership).
11. See infra Part III.A (discussing freedom of contract under Revised Uniform Partnership Act).
12. See infra Part III.B (discussing change in limited partnership law that allows limited
partners to exercise control over business).
13. See infraPart III.C (discussing LLPs and elimination of tradeoff between partnership
control and limited liability).
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partners. 4 In addition, Part III explains how the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act (RULPA) allows limited partners to exercise control without
incurring personal liability. Part III concludes with a discussion of LLPs and
compares LLPs to general partnerships. Part IV suggests that changes in
modem partnership law remove the basis for presuming that partnership
interests are or are not securities based solely on formal categories. Furthermore, Part IV proposes a test for determining whether an interest in a general
partnership, a limited partnership, or an LLP is a security. Part V concludes
that formal categories no longer reflect economic reality and that courts
should disregard form-based distinctions when deciding whether partnership
interests are securities.
I. FederalSecuritiesLaw and the Definition of"Security"
Congress intended the federal securities laws 5 to ensure fair disclosure
of financial information to potential investors. 6 The federal securities laws
apply to transactions involving "securities" as defined in the Securities Act of
193317 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.18 According to the Supreme
14. See infra Part III.A (discussing RUPA and situation where partner has little or no
power). The term "stripped general partners" refers to general partners who lack the traditional
attributes normally associated with being a partner (for example, participation in management
and control, sharing in partnership profits, and participating in decisions to admit new partners).
15. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-z (1994); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78(a)-(u) (1994).
16. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating
that fundamental purpose of statutes was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor"); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38,
40 (1941) (stating that purpose of securities law is to protect investors by requiring disclosure).
17. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing
agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription,
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit, for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest or
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (emphasis added).
18. Section 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas,
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Court, the definitions of the term "security" in the two Acts are essentially the
same."9 The definitions do not explicitly include either general or limited
partnership interests.20 Thus, to be deemed securities, partnership interests
must fall into one of the general categories enumerated in the definition of a
security.2
A. SEC v. Howey andthe Investment Contract Test
Courts and commentators generally agree that when deciding whether
partnership interests are securities, applying an investment contract analysis
is proper.' In the landmark case SEC v. W. J Howey Co., the Supreme Court
developed a four-part test for identifying an investment contract. 23 According
to theHowey Court, an investment contract is a contract, transaction, or scheme
in which there is an investment of money in a common enterprise with an
expectation of profits to be derived solely from the efforts of others.24 The
Court intended the Howey test to protect passive investors who lack the necessary knowledge or power to protect their investments.' In formulating the
or othermineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle, option, orprivilege
on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency,
or in general, any instrument commonly known as a "security;" br any certificate
of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not
include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (emphasis added).
19. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982) (stating that definition of
security in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is essentially same as definition of security in Securities Act of 1933); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,847 n. 12 (1975) (same).
20. See supra notes 17-18 (providing definition of word "security" from Securities Act
of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
21. See Everhard,supranote 6, at 444 (discussing treatment ofpartnership interests under
federal securities law).
22. See id. at 444 & n.22 (discussing investment contract analysis and its application to
partnership interests).
23. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (formulating four-part
investment contract test in deciding that interest in question is security).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 299 (stating that test embodies flexible principle capable of adaptation to
meet various schemes devised by those who seek to use other people's money with promise of
profits).
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Howey test, the Court clearly stated that the test embodies a flexible principle
that courts should adapt to new profit-making schemes when appropriate. 6
Howey involved operations by two Florida corporations, W. J. Howey
Company (Howey Co.) and Howey-in-the-Hills Service, Inc. (HI-S), that were
under direct common control and management.27 Howey Co. would plant
approximately five hundred acres of citrus groves annually, keep half for
itself, and sell the other half to the public in small tracts to finance further
development.28 HHS provided services in cultivating, developing, harvesting,
and marketing the crops that the citrus groves produced.29 When entering into
the land sales contracts with the public, Howey Co. told prospective investors
that their investment would not be feasible unless they also signed a service
contract with HHS.3" Not surprisingly, HHS acquired service contracts for
eighty-five percent of the acreage sold.31 These service contracts gave HHS
full discretion and authority over cultivation, harvesting, and marketing of the
investors' crops, with net profits later distributed to the investors.32 Most of
the investors were not Florida residents.33 Additionally, most were professionals or business people who lacked the necessary knowledge, skill, and
equipment required to care for and to cultivate citrus trees.34 According to the
Court, the people were "attracted by the expectation of substantial profits. 35
The Howey Court began its analysis by noting that the securities issue
turned on whether the land sales contract, the deed, and the service contract
collectively constituted an investment contract under federal securities law.36
The Court further noted that neither the Securities Act nor its legislative
history defined the term investment contract.37 Turning to state blue sky laws
that included the term "investment contract" prior to the enactment of federal
securities law, the Court found that state courts construed the term broadly "so
26. See id. (stating that Howey test "embodies a flexible rather than a static principle, one
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits").
27. Id. at 295.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 296.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 297. The Court noted that the lower courts treated the contracts and deeds as
separate transactions and therefore determined that no investment contract existed. Id. at 297-

98.
37.

Id. at 298.
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as to afford the investing public a full measure of protection."3 State courts
placed substance over form and emphasized the economic reality of investments.39 State law generally defined an investment contract as a "contract or
scheme for 'the placing of capital or laying out of money in a way intended
to secure income or profit from its employment." 4 The Court concluded that
adopting the state law interpretation of the term "investment contract" was
reasonable and consistent with the purposes of the Securities Act.4' In restating the test, the Court declared that an investment contract is "a contract,
transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common
enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter
or a third party."4 2 This broad definition embodies a flexibility designed to
include the numerous profit-making schemes that enterprising individuals
might develop.43
By cutting through legal terminology and focusing instead on economic
reality, the Howey Court found that the transactions involved were clearly
investment contracts.' The investors relied exclusively on HI-IS for any
profits derived from their investments. 45 Moreover, any attempt by an investor to6 manage his tract individually would have been economically unfeasi4
ble.
Partnerships, like other business organizations, generally involve a forprofit investment in a common enterprise. As a result, the first three parts of
Howey's test are almost always satisfied.4 7 The primary question when
dealing with partnership interests, then,
is whether an interest meets Howey's
"solely by the efforts of others" test.48
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 177 N.W. 937, 938 (Minn. 1920)).
Id.
Id. at 298-99.
Id.at 299.

44. Id.
45. Id at 300.
46. Id. The Court explained that to make a profit in the citrus industry, one must take
advantage of economies of scale because care, cultivation, harvesting, and marketing expenses
for a small tract would be cost prohibitive. Id.
47. See ALANR. BRoMBERG&LARRYE. RIBsTEiN, BRoMBERGANDRIBSTEINON LIMITED
LIABILrrYPARTNERs-pSANDTHEREVISEDUNiFOIMPARTNERSH[PAcr234 (1996) [hereinafter
BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, LLPs] (stating that partnership interests "undoubtably" satisfy first
three parts ofHowey). The first three parts of Howey require (1) an investment ofmoney (2) in
a common enterprise (3) with an expectation of profit. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,

298-99 (1946).
48.

BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, LLPs, supra note 47, at 234.
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Use of the word "solely" in Howey's test is problematic. If interpreted
literally, the term "solely" creates a significant loophole for those wishing to
avoid the securities laws and undermines protection of investors and the spirit
of flexibility embodied in Howey.49 In SEC v. Glenn W. TurnerEnterprises,
Inc.," the United States Court ofAppeals for the Ninth Circuit applied a liberal interpretation to Howey's "solely by the efforts of others" test. 1 The Glenn
Turner court declared that Howey's "efforts of others" test is satisfied when
those other than the investor make the essential managerial efforts that affect
the success or failure of the enterprise. 2 The Glenn Turner interpretation of
Howey has been adopted by several other federal circuit courts53 and apparently approved by the Supreme Court.' Glenn Turner and subsequent cases
49. See Jonathan M. Sobel, Note, A Rose May Not Always Be a Rose: Some General
PartnershipInterests Should Be Deemed Securities Under the Federal Securities Acts, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1313, 1324 (1994) (stating that strict enforcement of"solely" requirement
is inconsistent with policy of protecting investors).
50. 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. See SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating
that adherence to "solely" requirement would create unduly restrictive definition of investment
contract). Glenn Turner involved the sale of self-help plans by Dare To Be Great, Inc. (Dare),
a wholly owned subsidiary of Glenn W. Turner Enterprises (GWT). Id. at 477-78. Dare sold
five different plans varying in price and in contents, all of which purported to improve the selfmotivation and sales ability of the purchaser. Id. at 478. If a buyer purchased one of the three
most expensive plans, he obtained the right to sell plans to others and to retain a portion of the
purchase price. Id. The SEC brought suit seeking to enjoin Dare from selling the plans on the
ground that Dare was allegedly violating federal securities law. Id. at 477. The district court
granted the injunction and GWT appealed, arguing that the plans were not securities. Id. at 476.
The Glenn Turnercourt, after reciting the fraudulent excesses Dare employees would undertake
to pressure prospective purchasers into buying, noted that the remedial nature of federal
securities law called for broad interpretation of the term security. Id. at 482. The court found
that Dare's plans easily satisfied the first three parts of the investment contract test established
in Howey, but that the "solely" requirement in the "efforts of others" test was problematic. ld.
In noting that strict interpretation of the word "solely" would result in an "unduly restrictive"
interpretation of what is or is not an investment contract, the court opted for a more "realistic
test." Id. Thus, the court decided that the "efforts of others" test is satisfied where the "efforts
made by those other than the investor are the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise." Id. With the test restated,
the court deemed plans sold by Dare to be investment contracts, and thus securities. Id.
52. Id. at 482.
53. See Sobel, supranote 49, at 1325 n.59 (citing numerous cases adopting Glenn Turner

analysis).
54. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979) (citing
UnitedHous. Found v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975) and stating that "touchstone of the
Howey test is the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable
expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others");
Forman,421 U.S. at 852 (stating that "touchstone [of cases defining securities] is the presence
of an investment in a common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
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suggest that an investment contract exists when there is an investment in a
common venture with a reasonable expectation that profits will come primarily or substantially from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.5
B. TraditionalSecuritiesLaw Analysis of PartnershipInterests
1. GeneralPartnershipInterests as Securities
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether general partnership
interests orjoint venture interests are securities; however, several other courts
have discussed the issue. 6 In Williamson v. Tucker," the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that certain joint venture interests were
not securities under federal securities law. 8 The investors in Williamson purchased interests in real estate development projects in the form of three joint
ventures. 9 Although the promoter agreed to perform all management duties
with respect to the property, the joint venture agreements granted each investor some managerial power.6 The Williamson court stated that joint venture
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others"). Note that both Forman and
Danielomit the word "solely" in their restatements ofthe Howey test. Daniel,439 U.S. at 561;
Forman,421 U.S. at 852. However, the FormanCourt expressed no opinion as to the holding
in Glenn Turner. Forman, 421 U.S. at 852 n.16.
55. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 616 (stating that question is whether
investors are relying "primarily" on efforts of others); Elaine A. Welle, Limited Liability
Companies as Securities: An Analysis ofFederaland State Actions Against Limited Liability
Companies Under the SecuritiesLaws, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 425, 446 (1996) (declaring that
interest may be security if profits come "substantially" from efforts of others).
56. See Stephen G. Christianson, Annotation, What is "Investment Contract" within
Meaning of§ 2(1) of SecuritiesAct of 1933 (15 USCS § 77b(1)) and § 3(a)(10) ofSecurities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 USCS § 78c(a)(10)), Both Defining Term Security as Including
Investment Contract,134A.L.R. FED. 289,325-28 (1996) (discussing several cases determining
whether general partnership interests are securities).
57. 645 F.2d 404(5th Cir. 1981).
58. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 421 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that courts
ruling on issue of whether general partnership interests are securities have held that such
interests generally are not investment contracts under securities laws). The Williamson court
explained that general partnership interests are traditionally not securities because general
partners and joint venturers "have the sort of influence which generally provides them with
access to important information and protection against a dependence on others." Id at 422.
Furthermore, an "investor who is offered an interest in a general partnership or joint venture
should be on notice.., that his ownership rights are significant, and that the federal securities
acts will not protect him from a mere failure to exercise his rights." Id
59. Id. at 408.
60. Id.at 408-09. Each agreement required unanimous consent ofthe venturers to confess
ajudgment; to make execute, or deliver any commercial paper; to borrow money in the joint
venture's name; to use joint venture property as collateral; and to amend the joint venture
agreement. Id. Joint venturers also had power to remove the manager by a vote of 60% or 70%
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and general partnership interests are presumptively not securities because
investors in such entities normally have broad managerial powers."' The court
cautioned, however, that substance might prevail over form in some cases. 2
In focusing on the "efforts of others" part of Howey's test, the Williamson
court found that a general partnership or joint venture interest might be an
investment contract, and thus a security, if the investor can establish that:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands ofthe
partner or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would
a limited partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced and
unknowledgeable in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently
exercising his partnership or venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer
is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability ofthe
promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager ofthe enterprise or
otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers. 3
In finding that none of the factors from this disjunctive test were present, the
court held that the joint venture interests in question were not securities.'
The Williamson court placed great importance on the power that the
agreement granted to the joint venturers.65 The joint venturers purportedly
purchased their interests with the expectation that they would not exercise
managerial control, but the agreement nonetheless authorized such control."
In addition, the court stressed the high degree of business acumen possessed
by the joint venturers as evidence of their ability to exercise genuine managerial control over the enterprise.67 Finally, in reference to the third alternative
of its test,68 the court noted that the plaintiffs did not assert that the promoter
in interest. Id. at 409. It is not clear whether the joint venturers ever actually exercised their
powers. Id.
61.

Id. at 422.

62. See id. (stating "that the mere fact that an investment takes the form of a general
partnership orjoint venture does not inevitably insulate it from the reach of the federal securities
laws"). The court provided three examples of when partnership powers may be inadequate to
protect a partner from dependence on others: (1) ifthe partner irrevocably delegates his powers,
(2) if the partner is incapable of exercising his powers, or (3) if the partner is so dependent on
the particular expertise of the promoter or manager that he has no reasonable alternative but to
rely on that person. Id. at 422-23.
63. Id. at 424.
64.

Id. at 425-26.

65. See id. at 424 (explalning that agreement grantedjoint venturers ultimate control even
though they did not expect to exercise control).
66.

Id.

67. See id. at 425 (noting high degree of business experience and knowledge of joint
venturers). The court noted that among thejoint venturers were three top executives, including
the Chairman of the Board and the President of Frito-Lay, Inc. Id.
68. Id. at 424. The third alternative for determining whether a joint venture (or partner-
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had unique entrepreneurial or managerial skills or that their dependence on the
promoter was so great that they could not reasonably replace him.69 Thus, the
interests in Williamson were not securities."
Williamson created a workable but somewhat rigid test for determining
when partnership interests are securities.7 1 Although widely regarded as
authoritative, Williamson has been modified by some circuits72 and rejected
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Goodwin v.
Elkins & Co.73 The Goodwin court relied on state partnership law and the
ship) interest is a security is whether the venturer "is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot replace the manager of
the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership or venture powers." Id
69. Id.at 425. Here, the court injected a reasonableness standard into its third alternative
determination by requiring plaintiffs to allege that they were "incapable, within reasonable
limits, of finding a replacement manager." Id. (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 425-26.
71. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 619 (criticizing Williamson for placing
"undue emphasis on the legal aspects of general partnerships," and asserting that rigid Williamson test requires "a lack of sophistication or a type of dependence on unique skills that will
rarely be present in an investment setting"); see also Larry E. Ribstein, PrivateOrderingand
the Securities Laws: The Case of General Partnerships,42 CAsE W. REs. L. REV. 1, 49-50
(1992) [hereinafter Ribstein, Private Ordering](asserting that "Williamson comes very close
to holding that a bona fide general partnership interest is per se not a security even if the Howey
factors are satisfied").
72. See, e.g., Banghart v. Hollywood Gen. Partnership, 902 F.2d 805, 808 (10th Cir.
1990) (adopting only part one of Williamsontest which focuses simply on whether partnership
agreement grants sufficient power to partners, and not on whether partners actually exercise
those powers); Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1988) (explicitly adopting first part
of Williamson test and rejecting parts two and three). Note, however, that the Ninth Circuit
effectively overruled Matek in Hocking v. DuBois, 885 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1989), and confirmed the effect of Hocking in Holden v. Hagopian,978 F.2d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1992).
Under Holden, the Ninth Circuit now applies all three parts ofthe Williamson test to determine
whether general partnership interests are securities. Holden, 978 F.2d at 1119. The Holden
court stated that the heart of the inquiry is
whether, although on the face of the partnership agreement the investor theoretically retains substantial control over the investment and an ability to protect the
investment from the managing partner or hired manager, the investor nonetheless
can demonstrate such dependence on the promoter or on a third party that the
investor was in fact unable to exercise meaningful partnership powers.
Id.
73. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that general
partnership interest involved therein was not investment contract). Although the three judge
panel in Goodwinwas unanimous in its decision that the partnership interests involved were not
securities, each judge penned a separate opinion. 1d. at 100, 111, 113. Goodwin, a former
general partner of defendant Elkins & Co., brought suit alleging a violation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 100. Goodwin asserted that the partnership agreement gave him
so little power that he was in effect a limited partner. Id. at 103. In the opinion announcing the
judgment of the court, Judge Garth held that even if Goodwin could prove the partnership
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powers given to the partners in the partnership agreement to find that the
paitnership interest at issue was not a security.74 Although the three judge
panel in Goodwin unanimously agreed that the general partnership interest
involved was not a security, the judges differed in their reasoning. Judge
Garth, delivering the opinion of the court, decided that general partnership
interests are never securities because of the inherent power that state partnership law vests in partners. 75 In separate concurrences, Chief Judge Seitz and
Judge Becker confined their analyses to the power distribution in the partnership agreement. 6 Other federal courts have not adopted Judge Garth's per se
rule that general partnership interests are not securities, but instead employ
either all or part of the Williamson test and apply a rebuttable presumption
that general partnership interests are not securities.'
2. Limited PartnershipInterests as Securities
In contrast to general partnership interests, courts generally presume that
limited partnership interests are securities. 7' The rationale for this presumption is simple. A limited partnership, like most other business entities (including general partnerships), almost always involves an investment of money in
agreement restricted his powers, his partnership interest would not be a security. Id. Judge
Garth reasoned that because state partnership law endows general partners with certain "powers,
rights, and responsibilities," their interests cannot be securities under the Securities Act. Id. at
104. In separate concurring opinions, Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Becker disagreed with the
breadth of Judge Garth's opinion and based their decisions that Goodwin was not a security
holder solely on power granted in the partnership agreement. Id. at 112. Chief Judge Seitz and
Judge Becker agreed they "need not decide here whether a general partner's rights and responsibilities under the Pennsylvania Uniform Partnership Act are sufficient to prevent a general
partner's interest from being treated as a security for purposes of federal law." Id.
74. See supra note 73 (discussing Goodwin and differences in judges' opinions).
75. See Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 103 (declaring that law extends role of general partner well
beyond permitted role of passive investor); see also Ribstein, PrivateOrdering,supra note 71,
at 41-45 (arguing for per se rule that general partnership interests are not securities so as to
promote private ordering).
76. Goodwin, 730 F.2d at 111-13 (Seitz, C.J., concurring); id. at 113-14 (Becker, J.,
concurring).
77. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918,924-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying
Williamson factors and finding that interest is security when investor was "practically dependent" on manager); Hocking, 885 F.2d at 1460-61 (effectively overruling Matek v. Murat and
adopting three-prong test set out in Williamson). But see Banghart,902 F.2d at 808 (adopting
only part one of Williamsontest, which focuses simply on whether partnership agreement grants
sufficient power to partners, and not on whether partners actually exercise those powers). For
a general discussion of the approaches that courts take when deciding whether general partnership interests are securities, see Sobel, supra note 49, at 1327-44.
78. See SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that limited
partnership interest is generally security because, by definition, limited partnerships involve
investments where profits are derived from efforts of others).
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a common enterprise with an expectation of profit, and thus a limited partnership interest usually satisfies the first three parts of Howey. 9 General and
limited partnerships are, however, distinguished by the fourth part ofHowey's
test - whether profits derive primarily from the efforts of others.8" In general
partnerships, partners expect to participate equally in the management and in
the conduct of the business." Typically, however, a limited partner does not
participate in management and, historically, could lose his limited status and

incur personal liability for partnership obligations by participating in control
of the enterprise.82 Therefore, limited partners usually do not participate in
control of the business and thus rely on the efforts of others for a return on
their investment.83
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Youmans v. Simon,84 limited partners simply do not have the kind of authority
79. See supranote 8 (discussing Howey). The first three parts of Howey's test require
(1) an investment of money (2) in a common enterprise (3) with an expectation ofprofits. SEC
v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
80. See supranotes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing original "solely" requirement in Howey's fourth part, subsequent liberal interpretations by lower courts, and apparent
approval by Supreme Court).
81. See UPA (1914) § 18(e) (providing default rule that partners share equally in management); REVISED UNIF. PARTNERSHMP ACT (1996) § 401(f) [hereinafter RUPA] (providing
default rule that partners share equally in management). RUPA incorporates the limited liability
partnership amendments adopted in 1996. Note, however, that both UPA and RUPA provide
that an agreement among the partners may alter the general rule regarding management rights.
UPA § 18; RUPA § 103(a). See also POSNER, supra note 2, at 291 (suggesting that unlimited
liability encourages general partners to participate in firm management).
82. See ULPA (1916) § 7 (providing that limited partner may become liable as general
partner if he "takes part in the control of the business"); REVISED UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT (1976) § 303(a) [hereinafter RULPA] (providing that limited partner is not liable for
partnership obligations unless he participates in control of business). RULPA did, however,
significantly increase the ability of limited partners to participate in the control of the business.
Under RULPA, a limited partner participating in control is only liable "to persons who transact
business with the limited partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's
conduct, that the limited partner is a general partner." RULPA § 303(a). Limited partners may
now participate in management with impunity so long as they disclose to third parties their
limited partner status. Id; see RULPA § 303 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998) (eliminating all
language in current Section 303 and providing limited liability for limited partners "even if'
they participate in management and control). The tentative draft for RULPA Section 303
provides in part: "(a) A limited partner is not liable for a debt, obligation or other liability of the
limited partnership solely by reason of being a limited partner, even if the limited partner
participates in the management and control of the limited partnership." RULPA § 303 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
83. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 626 (stating that limited partnership
interests generally are securities because limited partners generally are passive investors). As
a result, a limited partnership interest is generally a security.
84. 791 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1986).
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that general partners possess." The Youmans court stated that limited partners' positions are analogous to those of corporate stockholders because
limited partners have limited liability, cannot dissolve the partnership, cannot
bind other partners, and have no authority to actively manage the partnership.86 Supported by the weight ofjudicial authority, the principle that limited
partnership interests are presumptively securities is very strong."
In Rodeo v. Gillman,8" the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit provided an example of investment contract analysis of limited partnership interests.8 9 In Gillman, the plaintiffs purchased limited partnership
interests in several apartment buildings." ° A few years later, the plaintiffs
brought suit against the managing general partners alleging, among other
things, federal securities law violations.9 The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment.92 On appeal, the defendants contended
85. See Youmans v. Simon, 791 F.2d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 1986) (suggesting that limited
partnership interests are securities within statutory definition). In Youmans, a physician who
participated in several real estate joint ventures brought suit alleging federal securities law
violations. Id. at 343-44. After discussing Howey and the Williamson factors, the court looked
to the economic reality of the investments to determine whether the joint venture interests were
securities. Id. at 345-47. Of the two joint ventures discussed, the court found the Dickinson
Apartment Project Venture was not a security because the investors held a 63% interest and
could terminate the joint venture by majority vote. Id. at 346. The Bidco-Tomball Joint
Venture was a security because the investors lacked management power, had no power to
dissolve the venture, and could not remove the managing venturer. Id. at 347. The court drew
a clear distinction between treatment of general partnership interests and limited partnership
interests, and suggested that limited partnership interests are always securities because limited
partners are passive investors. Id. at 346. But see supra note 82 (discussing impact of RULPA
Section 303 and increased power for limited partners if they disclose limited status).
86. Youmans, 791 F.2d at 346.
87. See Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 626-27 (discussing treatment of limited
partnership interests under federal securities law).
88. 787 F.2d 1175 (7th Cir. 1986).
89. See Rodeo v. Gillman, 787 F.2d 1175, 1177-79 (7th Cir. 1986) (deciding that limited
partnership interest is security even if accompanied with option to purchase enterprise). In
Gillman, the plaintiffs purchased limited partnership interests in apartment buildings and later
brought securities fraud allegations when the deal went sour. Id. at 1175. The plaintiffs held
an option to buy the general partners' interests, but never executed that option. Id. at 1176. In
deciding that the plaintiffs' limited partnership interests were securities, the court drew a
distinction between potential control and actual control. Id. at 1177. The court stated that
potential managerial control is not enough to take a limited partnership interest outside the reach
of securities law. Id. at 1178.
90. Id. at 1175. The investors, in addition to their limited partnership interest, obtained
an option to buy out the general partners. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment for the
defendants after concluding that such an option gave plaintiffs enough control over the investment to remove their interest from protection under the securities laws. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id.(granting defendant's summary judgment motion because plaintiffs' option to
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that the plaintiffs' limited partnership interests were not securities because the
plaintiffs held an option to buy the general partners' interests and thus had
ultimate control over management of the apartments.93 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the defendants' argument and noted that complete passivity is not a
requirement for an individual to be a security holder.94 The court, in finding
that the investors' limited partnership interests were securities, noted a difference between potential control and actual control.95 According to the court,
"[p]otential managerial control - even if easily assumed - is not enough to
take a limited partnership [interest] out of the reach of the securities laws."96

In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in
Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp97 found that a limited partnership interest
was not a security.98 Steinhardt involved a highly structured securitization
transaction that required defendant Citicorp to create a limited partnership,
Bristol Oaks, L.P. (Bristol), that would serve as an investment vehicle for
issuance of both debt and equity securities to investors.99 Bristol issued equity

securities in the form of limited partnership interests. 00 Bristol had one

buy general partners' interests removed plaintiffs' limited partnership interests from protection
under securities law).
93. Id. at 1176.
94. See id. at 1177 (stating that "we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts were
intended to cover only 'passive investors' and not privately negotiated transactions involving
the transfer of control to entrepreneurs" (citing Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681,
692 (1985))).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1178; see Garrison & Knoepfle, supra note 10, at 627 (analyzing previous
Seventh Circuit opinion Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1978)). Goodman suggested that a party can overcome the presumption that limited partnership interests are securities
by showing a "significant degree of managerial control" by the limited partners. Garrison &
Knoepfle, supra note 10,at 627. The presumption may be overcome if the limited partners are
not relying on the general partners' managerial efforts to obtain profits from the enterprise. Id.
at 627-28.
97. 126 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 1997).
98. See Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 155 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that
limited partner retained pervasive control and cannot be passive investor for purposes of
investment contract analysis). In Steinhardt,defendant Citicorp created a limited partnership
for the purpose of engaging in a securitization transaction. Id. at 146. Steinhardt was a limited
partner with a 98.79% ownership interest. Id. at 145. The Limited Partnership Agreement
(LPA) restricted the managing partner's right to take material actions without the consent of a
majority of the partners. Id. at 153. Because Steinhardt alone constituted a majority of the
partners, Steinhardt's consent was a prerequisite for material action. Id. at 154. Steinhardt
could also remove and replace the general partner without notice. Id. Because of the power
provided to Steinhardt under the LPA, the court deemed Steinhardt's interest significant and
thus, not a security. Id. at 155.
99. Id. at 146.
100. Id. Bristol issued debt securities in the form of nonrecourse bonds. Id.
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general partner and two limited partners. 1 ' Steinhardt, the party alleging
securities laws violations, was a limited partner with a 98.79% ownership
interest in Bristol.' In deciding whether Steinhardt's limited partnership
interest in Bristol constituted an investment contract, and thus a security, the
court focused on the Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) to determine who
exercised control in generating profits. 3 The LPA restricted the managing
partner's right to take material actions without the consent of a majority of the
partners."° Because the LPA defined "Majority of the Partners" as partners
holding more than a fifty percent interest in Bristol, Steinhardt alone constituted a majority.'0 5 Thus, Steinhardt had to consent before Bristol could take
any material action.0 6 Steinhardt also had the power to remove and to replace
the general partner without notice. 7 Given these facts, the court held that
Steinhardt's powers under the LPA "were not nominal, but rather, were
significant and, thus, directly affected the profits it received from the Partnership."'0 8 Therefore, Steinhardt's limited partnership interest was not an
investment contract. 0 9
III Modem PartnershipLaw
As illustrated above, specific factual circumstances are very important
in determining whether a partnership interest is a security. Some courts,
however, invariably approach securities cases with preconceived notions that
a partnership interest is or is not a security based solely on the type of partnership involved." 0 This Part discusses the minutiae of modern partnership law
and demonstrates that changes in the law provide significant flexibility in
forming partnerships. This flexibility masks formal categories such that
distinctions based solely on form have little basis. Thus, courts should reexamine whether traditional notions ofpartnership provide an adequate framework for securities law analysis.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id. at
Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.

145.
153-54.
153.
154.

107. Id.
108. Id.at 155.
109. Id.
110. See Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984) (suggesting that
general partnership interests are per se not securities because of power provided in state partnership law).
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A. GeneralPartnershipsUnder RUPA
Until recently, the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) provided the basic
format from which states derived their partnership statutes. Adopted in 1994,
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) is in many ways similar to
UPA."' There are, however, some significant differences. UPA Section 18
contains default rules that establish the rights and duties of partners in relation
to the partnership and makes those rules subject to modification by the partnership agreement."' Under UPA Section 18, only certain rights and duties
are subject to change by the partnership agreement and other duties, such as
a partner's fiduciary duty, are nonwaivable."' In contrast, RUPA Section 103
clearly grants broad contractual freedom followed by a short, exhaustive list

of rights and duties that the partnership agreement may not modify."
111. Similarities between UPA and RUPA include the following: (1) the definition of
"partnership" in UPA Section 6 and in RUPA Section 101(6), (2) rules governing partnership
formation in UPA Section 7 and in RUPA Section 202, and (3) characterization of partner's
interest as personal property in UPA Section 26 and in RUPA Section 502.
112. See UPA(1914) § 18 (providing that"[t]he rights and duties ofthe partners in relation
to the partnership shall be determined, subject to any agreement between them," by rules in
Section 18).
113. See Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (lst Cir. 1991) (stating that fiduciary duty
ofpartners is integral part of partnership and that words of partnership agreement cannot negate
fiduciary duty).
114. RUPA (1996) § 103. Section 103 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), relations among the partners and
between the partners and the partnership are governed by the partnership agreement.
To the extent the partnership agreement does not otherwise provide, this [Act] governs relations among the partners and between the partners and the partnership.
(b) The partnership agreement may not:
(1) vary the rights and duties under Section 105 except to eliminate the duty
to provide copies of statements to all of the partners;
(2) unreasonably restrict the right of access to books and records under Section
403(b);
(3) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 404(b) or 603(b)(3), but:
(i) the partnership agreement may identify specific types or categories of
activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; or
(ii) all of the partners or a number or percentage specified in the partnership agreement may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure of all material
facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would violate the duty of
loyalty;
(4) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 404(c) or 603(b)(3);
(5) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section
404(d), but the partnership agreement may prescribe the standards by which the
performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are not manifestly unreasonable; ...
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RUPA's break from the statutory regime of UPA is subtle, yet important.
The provisions in UPA Section 18 were clearly subject to change by the
partnership agreement." 5 Other sections, such as UPA Section 20, which
deals with a partner's right to demand information concerning the partnership,
did not mention the partnership agreement." 6 UPA's silence about whether
some provisions were subject to change resulted in inconsistent court decisions." 7 RUPA attempts to correct this flaw by clearly identifying provisions
the partnership agreement may modify."' This clarity confirms the ability to
create partnerships with strong centralized management where some partners
have virtually no power to participate in management." 9 This lack of power
reduces the ability of partners to protect adequately their investments and thus
implicates securities law because insufficient power suggests reliance on the
efforts of others. 2 °
One primary safeguard protecting partners under the UPA regime was the
requirement of unanimous consent for undertaking extraordinary matters.'
Extraordinary matters include amending the partnership agreement and other
matters outside the ordinary course of the partnership's business.' Although
UPA did not specifically provide rules regarding extraordinary matters, courts
routinely required the partners' unanimous consent for extraordinary actions. "
RUPA allows partnerships to eliminate completely the unanimous consent
requirement for extraordinary matters. 2 4 Eliminating a general partner's

(10) restrict rights of third parties under this [Act].
Id.
115. See supra note 112 (providing language from UPA Section 18).
116. UPA § 20. Section 20 provides: "Partners shall render on demand true and full
information of all things affecting the partnership to any partner or the legal representative of
any deceased partner or partner under legal disability." Id.
117. See ROBERT W. HILLMAN ET AL., GENERAL AND LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS
UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP AcT

21 (1996) (stating that UPA silence held to

preclude modification in some situations but not in others).
118. Id.
119. See infra notes 121-159 and accompanying text (discussing creation of stripped
general partners).
120. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing "efforts of others" test).
121. See RUPA (1996) § 401 cmt. 11 (discussing extraordinary matters and general treatment under UPA).
122. See id. (equating "extraordinary matters" with matters outside ordinary course of
partnership business and amendments of partnership agreement).
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. See id. § 4010) (providing that "act outside the ordinary course of business of a
partnership and an amendment to the partnership agreement may be undertaken only with the
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ability to halt extraordinary matters is the first step toward creating a stripped
general partner.
In addition to the unanimous consent rule for extraordinary matters, all
other rights and duties enumerated in RUPA Section 401 are subject to modification or complete elimination." Applying the broad freedom of contract
granted in RUPA Section 103 to the rights and duties in RUPA Section 401,

a partnership agreement may, among other things, eliminate a partner's right
to share in partnership profits, 26 eliminate a partner's right to participate in
the management and conduct of the business, 27 and eliminate the unanimous
consent requirement for adding new partners.'28 RUPA clearly provides tools
that allow a partnership to eliminate the essential attributes normally associated with general partners. Indeed, under RUPA, a partnership can completely
strip a partner of meaningful partnership powers and yet the partner could
remain personally liable for partnership obligations.' 29
consent of all of the partners"). But see id § 103 (providing broad rule that all default rules in
RUPA are subject to change or elimination if not included in Section 103(b)). The unanimous
consent rule in Section 401(j) is not among those provisions enumerated in Section 103(b). Id.
125. See id. § 103 (providing broad general rule that default rules in RUPA are subject
to modification or elimination and excepting no RUPA Section 401 provisions from general
rule).
126. See id § 401(b) (providing that each partner is entitled to share equally in partnership

profits).
127. See id. § 401(f) (providing that each partner has equal management rights).
128. Seeid. § 401(i) (providingthatallpartnersmustconsentforpersontobecomepartner).
129. See id. § 306(a) (stating that"all partners are liablejointly and severally for all obligations of the partnership unless otherwise agreed by the claimant or provided by law"). Notwithstanding joint and several liability of partners authorized under RUPA Section 306, RUPA
places restrictions on a judgment creditor's access to assets of partners. Id.§ 307(d). RUPA
Section 307 provides in part:
(c) A judgment against a partnership is not by itself ajudgment against a partner.
Ajudgment against apartnership may notbe satisfied from a partner's assets unless
there is also a judgment against the partner.
(d) Ajudgment creditor of a partner may not levy execution against the assets of
the partner to satisfy ajudgment based on a claim against the partnership unless the
partner is personally liable for the claim under Section 306 and:
(1) ajudgment based on the same claim has been obtained against the partnership and a writ of execution on thejudgment has been returned unsatisfied in
whole or in part;
(2) the partnership is a debtor in bankruptcy;
(3) the partner has agreed that the creditor need not exhaust partnership assets;
(4) a court grants permission to thejudgment creditor to levy execution against
the assets of a partner based on a finding that partnership assets subject to
execution are clearly insufficient to satisfy the judgment, that exhaustion of
partnership assets is excessively burdensome, or that the grant of permission is
an appropriate exercise of the court's equitable powers; or
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In addition to allowing the partnership agreement to restrict a partner's
power, RUPA allows restrictions on a partner's right to access information.13 '
RUPA Section 403(b) provides that a partnership shall provide its partners
access to the partnership's "books and records."' 1 A partnership may not
unreasonably restrict such access to "books and records."13 1 RUPA Section 403(c) provides partners with rights to access any information concerning
the partnership's "business and affairs" unless the demand or information
requested is unreasonable or improper.3 3 However, RUPA Section 403(c) is

conspicuously absent from the RUPA Section 103(b) list of provisions not
subject to change by the partnership agreement.' 34 Although the common law
may independently provide partners with the right to access business information,' 35 RUPA, on its face, clearly allows elimination of a partner's right to
access information concerning the partnership's business and affairs. 36
Partnerships may also restrict a partner's power by filing statements of
partnership authority pursuant to RUPA Section 303.' The purposes of
(5) liability is imposed on the partner by law or contract independent of the
existence of the partnership.
Id. § 307(c)-(d).
130. Id. § 103(b). Section 103(b) expressly prohibits an unreasonable restriction on a
partner's rightto access "books and records" underRUPA Section 403(b), but does notprohibit
restrictions on a partner's rightto access information concerning the partnership's "business and
affairs" under RUPA Section 403(c).
131. Id. § 40 1(b). Section 40 1(b) also provides access to a partner's agents and attorneys,
and former partners and their agents -and attorneys for the period during which they were
partners. Id. For a discussion of what the term "books and records" includes, see HILLMAN ET
AL., supra note 117, at 130-31 (concluding that "books and records" includes records beyond
mere financial records).
132. RUPA(1996) § 103(b)(2).
133. Id. § 403(c). The partner or partnership subject to the demand for information bears
the burden of showing that the demand is unreasonable or improper. Id § 403 cmt. 3.
134. See id. § 103(b) (omitting RUPA Section 403(c) from list of provisions not subject
to modification by partnership agreement).
135. See HILLMAN ET AL., supra note 117, at 138-40 (discussing whether RUPA rules
displace common law disclosure obligations); see also Allan W. Vestal, The Disclosure
Obligations of PartnersInterSe Under the Revised Uniform PartnershipAct of 1994: Is the
ContractarianRevolution Failing?,36 WM. &MARYL. RaV. 1559, 1613-15 (1995) (arguing
that RUPA does not completely displace common law disclosure obligations of partners).
136. See RUPA § 403(c) (providing that partnership shall furnish partner with information
concerning partnership business and affairs). But see RUPA § 103 (providing broad rule that
all default rules in RUPA are subject to change or elimination if not included in Section 103(b)).
The information rights provision in Section 403(c) is not among those provisions enumerated
in Section 103(b). Id.
137. See id. § 303(a)(2) (providing that partnership may file statement of partnership
authority that states authority or limitations on authority of its partners to enter into transactions
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RUPA Section 303 are threefold: it creates a system for filing standard
business documents,138 it binds the partnership to extraordinary grants of
authority to partners in real property transfers,'39 and it binds third parties to
restrictions on authority of partners. 40 A partnership may file a statement that
grants or limits the authority of some or all of its partners to transact with third
parties on behalf of the partnership.' 4' Statements of partnership authority

memorialize grants or restrictions of authority so as to provide certainty to
third parties. 4 1 Statements of authority also impact the rights and remedies
of third parties who transact with partners named in a statement. In real
property transfers, statements of authority, if properly filed, provide third
parties with constructive notice that certain partners have no authority to
transfer real property on behalf oftie partnership.4 3 In all other transactions
with partners, a third party's remedy is curtailed only if he has actual notice
of a limitation contained in a filed statement.'"
One might think it unlikely that a prospective general partner would sign
a partnership agreement providing almost no power with which to protect his
partnership interest. In some very large partnerships inwhich prospective
partners have weak bargaining positions, they must agree, however, to have
limited power if they want to become a partner. The partnership agreement
on behalf of partnership).
138. See HILLMAN T AL., supra note 117, at 94 (noting that filing system allows third
parties to record instruments to protectthemselves when dealing with partnerships and provides
assurance to third parties that partner has actual authority to act on behalf of partnership).
139. See'id. (noting that third parties have statutory right to rely on statements granting
partners extraordinary authority to act for partnership).
140. CompareRUPA(1996)§ 303(e) (providingthatthird parties have constructivenotice
of limitation on partner's right to transfer real property if statement of authority is properly
filed) with RUPA § 303(f) (providing general rule that statement of authority does not impart
constructive notice on third parties).
141. RUPA § 303(a)(2).
142. See HILLMAN FT AL., supra note 117, at 94 (stating that third parties (for example,
lenders, landlords, and sellers) often require partnerships to submit names of all partners with
authority to bind partnership and that filing system eliminates this step and binds partnership
to authority granted in statement).
143. RUPA § 303(e). Section 303(e) provides:
A person not a partner is deemed to know of a limitation on the authority of a partner to transfer real property held in the name of the partnership if a certified copy
of the filed statement containing the limitation on authority is ofrecord in the office
for recording transfers of that real property.
Id.
144. See id.§ 303(f) (providing general rule that third parties are "not deemed to know of
a limitation on the authority of a partner merely because the limitation is contained in a filed
statement").
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in Simpson v. Ernst & Young'45 provides a particularized example of how a
partnership can strip a partner of the essential attributes traditionally associated with general partners.'4 6
The Simpson case involved the merger of two large accounting firms,
Ernst & Whinney and Arthur Young & Co., forming a 2200 partner mega-firm
styled Ernst & Young. 4 7 Simpson, a former managing partner of Arthur
Young's Cincinnati office, became a partner in Ernst & Young and served as
Director of Entrepreneurial Services in Cincinnati. 48 The partnership structure of Ernst & Young involved a highly centralized management scheme and
included general partners with little or no voice in the firm. 49 The court held
that for the purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), Simpson

was in economic reality an employee and not a partner. 50

Of particular interest to the court was the firm's Management Committee.' 5 ' The Management Committee consisted often to fourteen members who
exercised exclusive control over the firm's business and affairs, including the
145. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996).
146. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 443-44 (6th Cir. 1996) (comparing
partnership agreement to principles codified in UPA and concluding that lack of indicia of
ownership qualifies partner as employee for purposes of Employee Retirement Income Security
Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act claims). In Simpson, the Sixth Circuit
determined relevant factors for distinguishing between an "employee" and a "partner" for
purposes of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. at 444. The plaintiff, a general partner at Ernst & Young,
brought suit alleging damages pursuant to ERISA and ADEA. Id. at 438. Ernst & Young
raised as a defense Simpson's status as a "partner." Id. Although Simpson signed a document
titled "Partnership Agreement," he argued that in reality he was merely an employee entitled to
protection under federal law. Id. at 440. The Simpson court engaged in a behind-the-documents analysis in determining whether Simpson qualified as an employee. Id. at 444. In
reaching its conclusion, the court enumerated several common lav attributes of partners as
codified in the Uniform Partnership Act. Id. These attributes included the following: (1) the
rightto participate in management, (2) the rightto act as an agent of other partners, (3) personal
liability, (4) a fiduciary relationship among partners, (5) using the term "co-owners" to indicate
each partner's "power of ultimate control," (6) participating in firm profits and losses, (7) an
investment in the firm, (8) part ownership of the firm's assets, (9) meaningful voting rights,
(10) the ability to control and operate the business, (11) compensation calculated as a percentage of the firm's profits, (12) employment security, and (13) other similar indicia of ownership.
Id. After finding most of these attributes missing, the court decided that Simpson qualified as
an employee and could bring suit under ERISA and ADEA. Id.
147. Id. at 440, 445.
148. Id. at440.
149. Id. at 441.
150. Id. at 444.
151. Id. at441-42.

MODERN PARTNERSHIP 1NTERESTS AS SECURITIES
admission and discharge of all personnel. 5 2 In addition, the Management
Committee was a self-perpetuating entity, with the Committee appointing
its
53
chairman and, in turn, the chairman appointing its new members.
In addition to creating a strong centralized management scheme, the
partnership agreement also curtailed almost all "meaningful attributes" of
Simpson's status as a partner.154 For example, the trial judge found that

Simpson had no authority to participate in decisions to admit or discharge new

partners, 5 5participate in decisions regarding partner compensation,156 vote for
members or the chairman of the Management Committee, 57 or share in the
firm's profits. 8 Clearly, Simpson lacked the kind of authority that general
152. Id. A centralized management structure is permissible under RUPA because the
default rule that provides partners with equal management rights is subject to change by the
partnership agreement. RUPA (1996) § 103.
153. Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 1996).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 441. This runs contrary to the default rule in RUPA Section 401(i) which
provides that all partners must consent to admission of new partners. RUPA § 401(i). This
default rule is, however, subjectto modification or elimination pursuantto RUPA Section 103.
See id.§ 103(b) (providing exhaustive list of things partnership agreement may not do and not
including RUPA Section 401(i)).
156. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441. Participating in decisions regarding partner compensation
might be among the powers normally given to partners to participate in the firm's management
and control. See RUPA § 401(f) (providing each partner with equal rights in management and
conduct of partnership's business). The rule in RUPA Section 401(f) is, however, subject to
modification or elimination pursuant to RUPA Section 103. See id. § 103(b) (omitting RUPA
Section 401(f)).
157. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441. There is nothing inherently suspect about a management
committee controlling firm operations. In large law and accounting firms with hundreds of
partners, requiring each partner to vote on every management decision would be impractical.
Administrative feasibility and economic efficiency problems force some centralization of management in large firms. Often in these cases, partners vote for management committee members
and thus participate in management through their representatives. In Simpson, however, the
partnership agreement even removed Simpson's power to vote for management. Id. at 441-42.
RUPA Section 103(b) places no restrictions on the degree to which the partnership agreement
may curtail a partner's right to participate in management and control. RUPA § 103(b).
158. Simpson, 100 F.3d at 441. The default rule in RUPA Section 401(b) entitles each
partner to an equal share of the firm's profits. RUPA (1996) § 401(b). This rule is, however,
subjectto modification pursuantto RUPA Section 103. Id. § 103(b). In large partnerships, there
are inevitably some partners with more seniority than others, and thus some partners earn a greater
share of the firm's profits. Modifying a partner's share of profits is common, but entirely
eliminating a partner's right to profits is problematic. At least one commentator has questioned
the Simpson court's factual determination that Simpson did not share in the firm's profits. See
Sixth CircuitHoldsthat Partnersin an AccountingFirmare EmployeesforPurposesofERISA
and the ADEA, 6No. 1 ERISA LMG. REP. 16, 18 (1997) (discussing Simpson's compensation
scheme and suggesting that he did share in firm profits). According to this article, Simpson
received a fixed "salary" and an additional "allocation" at year's end based on firm profits. Id.
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partners traditionally hold. Although Simpson may be an extreme case, the
degree to which the Ernst & Young partnership agreement restricted Simpson's authority provides a clear example of a stripped general partner.
In summary, this section illustrates the subtle changes in modem general
partnership law that enable partnerships to modify drastically or to even
eliminate those essential attributes traditionally associated with being a
general partner. For example, a partnership agreement may eliminate a partner's right to vote on important business decisions, eliminate his right to share
in profits, and eliminate his access to information concerningthe partnership's
business and affairs. General partnership law provides partnerships with
maximum flexibility to shape management and organizational structure in
almost any way imaginable. Flexibility, however, may solve some problems
while creating others not imagined. 59
B. LimitedPartnershipsUnder RULPA
Limited partnerships developed to allow noncorporate profit-sharing
investors to limit their liability to the amount they contributed to the firm. 60
Initially, limited partnership statutes permitted limited partners to obtain limited liability and to participate in management.' Thereafter, courts looked
toward limited partnerships with skepticism because conventional wisdom
suggested that those participating in profits during prosperity should likewise
suffer losses upon failure. 62 To provide some certainty in this area, the Committee on Commercial Law drafted the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
(ULPA) in 19 16.163 ULPA clarified limited partnership law significantly, but
its control provision proved somewhat vague.' ULPA provided that a limmight be treated as a general partner, but did
ited partner exercising control 65
not define the word "control."1
159. Potential problems might include actions under employment discrimination laws or
actions for securities fraud under federal or state securities laws.
160. See Comment, supra note 3, at 895-96 (providing brief history of limited partnerships).
161. See id. (discussing first limited partnership statute, which was enacted in New York
in 1822).
162. See id. (discussing degree to which courts scrutinized limited partnership formation
and required strict adherence to statutory provisions to maintain limited partnership status).
163. 3 ALANR BROMBERG&LARRYE. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERGAND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 11:20 (1988) [hereinafter BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP]. The Committee on
Commercial Law wrote ULPA and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws presented it. Id.
164. ULPA (1916) § 7. Section 7 provides: "A limited partner shall not become liable as
a general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner,
he takes part in the control of the business." Id
165. Id. For an in-depth discussion of activities that may or may not result in loss of
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The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 and the 1985
166
amendments thereto (collectively RULPA) clarify the meaning of control.
Under RULPA, a limited partner may still be treated as a general partner ifhe
participates in control of the firm, but the limited partner is only liable to
those third parties who reasonably believe that the limited partner is a general
partner. 67 Furthermore, for the limited partner to lose limited status, third
parties must base their reasonable beliefs upon the limited partner's conduct.168 Thus, the clear import of RULPA is that a limited partner may control
the business without incurring personal liability so long as he notifies
third
169
parties with whom he is dealing that he is not a general partner.
The latest proposed revision to RULPA would further encourage limited
partners to participate in firm management. A proposed draft of RULPA
Section 303 entirely eliminates previous language and provides instead that
a limited partner is not liable for partnership obligations "even if" he participates in management and control. 7 ' The current trend of allowing limited
partners to participate actively in firm management undermines the traditional
tradeoff between control and liability and serves to blur distinctions between
general and limited partnerships. Blurred distinctions between general and
limited partnerships suggest thattraditional presumptions applied in securities
law analysis may no longer be valid.'
C. Limited LiabilityPartnershipsUnderRUPA
1. Background
The recent advent of limited liability partnerships (LLPs) coupled with
the freedom of contract permitted under RUPA effectively eliminate the
traditional tradeoff between control and liability. Both the corporate and
traditional limited partnership forms exemplify this tradeoff. A corporation's
limited status for participation in "control," see 3 BROMBERG &RIBSTEIn, PARTNERSHIP, supra
note 163, at 15:116-15:130.
166. See RULPA (1976) § 303(b) (providing list of activities that do not qualify as
participating in control).
167. Id. § 303(a).
168. Id.
169. Id. In addition, RULPA also provides a nonexhaustive list of activities that do not
qualify as participating in the control of the business. Il § 303(b).

170. Id. § 303(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
171. See supra Parts II.B.1-2 (discussing traditional treatment of general and limited
partnership interests under federal securities law). Traditionally, courts presume that limited
partnership interests are securities and that general partnership interests are not securities. See
Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that general partnership
interests presumptively are not securities); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41 (9th Cir.
1980) (suggesting that limited partnership interests presumptively are securities).
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shareholders have limited personal liability and risk nothing beyond their
initial investment.'72 Traditionally, in exchange for limited liability, the shareholders give up their right to manage directly corporate affairs and instead
must exercise their power by electing directors. 7 3 Limited partners obtain
limited liability by giving up management rights in the business. 74 Traditionally, if a limited partner went beyond his rights and participated in the control
of the business, he lost limited status and became personally liable for partnership obligations. 75 In contrast to corporations and limited partnerships, LLPs
provide partners with limited liability 176 without restricting management
rights.

177

172. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (1984) [hereinafter MBCA] (providing that
shareholder is not personally liable for corporate obligations, but may become liable by reason
of his own acts or conduct).
173. See DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 2 (1993) (stating that power
to elect directors is power most central to shareholder's role). The MBCA allows corporations
to change this traditional separation between shareholders and managers in a corporation.
MBCA § 7.32. The MBCA authorizes shareholder agreements among the shareholders that
eliminate entirely the board of directors, thereby permitting direct shareholder mangementId. § 7.32(a)(1). Obviously, administrative feasibility limits such a management scheme to
closely held corporations.
174. ULPA (1916) § 7; RULPA (1976) § 303(a). Modem limited partnership statutes
further erode the traditional tradeoff between control and liability in limited partnerships. See
supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing degree to which limited partner may
participate in control of firm).
175. See ULPA § 7 (providing for loss of limited status if limited partner participates in
control of business). Butsee RULPA § 303 (replacing ULPA Section 7). RULPA Section 303
adopted the idea that a limited partner forfeits limited status by participating in control of the
business. Id. § 303(a). However, RULPA Section 303 declares that a limited partner participating in control of the business "is liable only to persons who transact business with the limited
partnership reasonably believing, based upon the limited partner's conduct, that the limited
partner is a general partner." Id. This language takes much of the bite out of the traditional
tradeoff between control and liability and suggests that a limited partner may engage in
unlimited control without fear of losing limited status as long as he discloses to third parties that
he is a limited partner and not a general partner. Furthermore, a proposed revision to RULPA
Section 303 would provide limited liability for a limited partner "even if" he participates in the
management and control of the firm. RULPA § 303(a) (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1998).
176. RUPA (1996) § 306(c) provides:
An obligation of a partnership incurred while the partnership is a limited liability
partnership, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, is solely the obligation
of the partnership. A partner is not personally liable, directly or indirectly, by way
of contribution or otherwise, for such a partnership obligation solely by reason of
being or so acting as a partner. This subsection applies notwithstanding anything
inconsistent in the partnership agreement that existed immediately before the vote
required to become a limited liability partnership under Section 1001(b).
Id.
177. See id. § 401(f) (providing that each partner has equal rights in management and
conduct of partnership). This rule, however, is merely a default rule and is subject to modifica-
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LLPs originated in Texas in response to the savings and loan crisis and
several lawsuits imposing personal liability on partners in various law and
accounting firms. 17 Although styled as "limited liability partnerships," LLPs
are simply general partnerships that obtain limited liability for their partners
by filing a registration in their respective state. 179 Proving to be very popular
among state legislatures, LLP provisions have been enacted in almost every
state and in the District of Columbia.' In most of these states, any general
partnership may register as an LLP, but California, Nevada, New York, and
Oregon limit LLP election to partnerships that provide professional services.' Because LLP statutes may vary from state to state, this Note focuses

its discussion on the 1996 Limited Liability Partnership amendments to RUPA.
A general partnership may become an LLP pursuant to RUPA Section 1001 by filing a statement of qualification.' Upon filing the statement
of qualification, the LLP must include in its name words identifying its
limited liability status.' Although uniform in name, the nature of the liability
shield afforded partners in LLPs varies from state to state.'" Over the past
five years, three generations of LLP statutes have evolved with ever broadention by the partnership agreement; see also id. § 103(a) (providing that relations among partners
and between partners and partnership are governed by partnership agreement); supraPart III.A
(discussing provisions under RUPA subject to modification or elimination).
178. See HILLMAN rAL., supra note 117, at 301 (stating that LLPs developed in response
to Resolution Trust Corporation and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation holding lawyers
and accountants liable for losses caused by failed savings and loan associations).
179. See RUPA § 1001 (authorizing statements of qualification enabling partnerships to
become LLPs).
180. As of January 1998, Arkansas, Vermont, and Wyoming were the only states that had
not adopted limited liability partnership provisions.
181. See CAL. CORP. CODE §16101(6) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998) (providing that only
accounting firms, law firms, and firms related to registered accounting or law firms may register
as limited liability partnerships);NEv. REv. STAT. § 87.020(7) (1997) (providing that only firms
formed for purpose of rendering professional services may register as limited liability partnerships);N.Y. PARTNERSHIPLAw, § 121-1500(a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997) (providing that
only firms authorized to render professional services in New York may register as limited
liability partnerships); OR. REv. STAT. § 68-110(3) (1995) (providing that registration as limited
liability partnership is permissible if firm provides professional services or is affiliated with
domestic or foreign limited liability partnership that provides related or complementary
services).
182. See RUPA (1996) § 1001 (providing rules for filing and content requirements for
statements of qualification).
183. See id. § 1002 (providing that name of LLP must end with "Registered Limited
Liability Partnership," "Limited Liability Partnership," "R.L.L.P.," "L.L.P.," "RLLP," or
"LLP").
184. See Carol J. Miller, LLPs: How Limited is LimitedLiability?,53 J. Mo. B. 154, 154
(1997) (discussing nature of limited liability shield and noting evolution from narrow to broad
shield).
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ing liability shields." 5 RUPA includes the third generation comprehensive
liability shield giving partners protection from direct or indirect liability for
partnership debts and obligations whether arising from tort, contract or
otherwise. 6 This broad liability shield does not, however, protect a partner
from liability stemming from his own negligence, malpractice, misconduct,
or wrongful acts." 7
2. Comparison ofLLPs to General Partnerships
RUPA defines an LLP explicitly as a "partnership" that has achieved
limited liability by filing a statement ofqualification. 8 Thus, RUPA's default
rules for general partnerships apply equally to LLPs and provide for many similarities between general partnerships and LLPs. There are, however, some
important differences. Unlike a general partnership, forming an LLP requires
certain formalities and thus formation cannot occur inadvertently. 9 The most
important difference between general partnerships and LLPs, however, is the
limited liability shield, which may affect other aspects of the partnership.'
Obtaining limited liability will likely affect the distribution of partners'
management rights in the partnership agreement. 9 ' Conventional wisdom
suggests that partners with limited liability are less concerned with active
participation in the management and in the control of the business. Thus,
becoming an LLP may encourage centralization of management."9 LLP
185. Id. First generation statutes provided a liability shield for non-negligent partners who
had no notice or knowledge of the misconduct that created the liability for the partnership. Id.
Thus, these first generation statutes did not entirely shield partners from others' negligence. Id.
at 155. Second generation statues broadened the liability shield to protect partners from liability
stemming from another partner's misconduct. Id. These statutes also included protection from
indirect liability by way of contribution or indemnification. Id. Third generation statutes
provide an even broader shield protecting partners from personal liability for all partnership
debts and obligations. Id.
186. See RUPA § 306(c) (providing for broad limited liability shield). For the exact
language of RUPA Section 306(c), see supra note 176.
187. See id. § 306 cmt. 3 (stating that partners remain personally liable for their own misconduct).
188. Id. § 101(5).
189. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, LLPS, supranote 47, at 17 (discussing formalities such
as registration and name requirements).
190. See id. at 22 (noting that express statutory differences may support other differences
between general partnerships and LLPs).
191. See id. at 77-85 (suggesting changes partners should consider making to partnership
agreement upon obtaining LLP status).
192. See id. at 82 (noting that LLP registration does not require restructured management
rights but may justify judicial enforcement of centralized management schemes). Professors
Bromberg and Ribstein point out, however, that an LLP should be careful to not jeopardize its
status as a partnership under employment discrimination, tax, and securities law. Id. at 82-83.
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registration may also encourage partnerships to reallocate profit distribution
plans to reflect increased risk to partners in more liability-prone practice
areas.19 The increased flexibility provided in modem partnership law and the
development of limited liability partnerships serves to blur form-based distinctions between business entities.19 It is now possible to have general partners
with almost no power and limited partners exercising pervasive control without incurring personal liability.'95 Part IV discusses the effect this flexibility
has on investment contract analysis.
1.

Investment ContractAnalysis Under Modem PartnershipLaw
A. DiminishedImportance of FormalCategories

The Supreme Court often emphasizes the importance of economic reality
in defining the word "security."'9 6 In carrying out the Supreme Court's directions, the Fifth Circuit, in Williamson v. Tucker,'97 developed a test designed
to allow substance to prevail over form in some situations.198 However, the
Providing partners with strong management and voting rights will likely preserve treatment as
a partnership under these other statutes. Id
193. See id. at 83 (discussing impact of LLP election on profit sharing ratios).
194. See supra Part III.A (discussing freedom of contract under RUPA and creation of
general partners with little or no managerial control); see also supra Part III.B (discussing
changes to RULPA that allow limited partners more ability to exercise control without losing
limited liability).
195. See supraParts III.A-III.B (discussing changes in law that affect traditional tradeoff
between control and liability in partnerships).
196. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,336 (1967) (stating that in defining security,
"form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on economic reality");
SEC v. W. J. Howey, Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (discussing definition of investment
contract under state law and stating that "[florm was disregarded for substance and emphasis
was placed upon economic reality").
197. 645 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1981). As discussed above in Part II.B.1, Williamson involved
the purchase ofjoint venture interests in real estate development projects. 1d. at408. Foradiscussion of the facts and the result in Williamson, see supra notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
198. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981) (providing three part
test). The Williamson court found that a general partnership or joint venture interest might be
deemed an investment contract, and thus a security, if the investor can establish that:
(1) an agreement among the parties leaves so little power in the hands of the partner
or venturer that the arrangement in fact distributes power as would a limited
partnership; or (2) the partner or venturer is so inexperienced and unknowledgeable
in business affairs that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership or
venture powers; or (3) the partner or venturer is so dependent on some unique
entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot
replace the manager of the enterprise or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership
or venture powers.
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Williamsoncourt explicitly acknowledged the importance it placed on form.'99
The court stated that a general partner who claims his interest is a security has
a "difficult burden to overcome" because the general partner retains substantial control over his investment."' But general partners do not always retain
substantial control because RUPA permits a partnership agreement to strip a
general partner of power and to thus provide the partner with no control over
his investment.2 A partner with no power should not face a "difficult burden" in proving his interest is a security. Furthermore, the first part of Williamson'stest provides that a general partnership interest might be a security
if the partnership agreement distributes power "as would a limited partner2 But limited partnerships
ship."2M
do not distribute power according to any
one particular management scheme. Instead, power distribution depends on
the terms of the limited partnership agreement, and RULPA permits limited
partners to exercise significant control over partnership affairs. 0 3 The Williamson court clearly placed significant importance on formal categories, but
Part III of this Note demonstrates that form has little meaning.2
To support the assertion that the labels general partnership and limited
partnership now have little meaning, compare the underlying general partnership in Simpson v. Ernst& Young"' with the limited partnership in Steinhardt
GroupInc.v. Citicorp.? In Simpson,the typical general partner could notvote
for management committee members, could not participate in compensation
decisions, could not share in firm profits, and had no part in decisions to admit
new partners. 0 7 In contrast, the limited partner in Steinhardtheld a 98.79%
ownership interest and retained pervasive control over the partnership.0 8
199. See Ribstein, Private Ordering,supranote 71, at 49-50 (suggesting that Williamson
comes close to establishing per se test that general partnership interests are not securities).
200. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
201. See supra Part III.A (discussing RUPA and flexibility provided to create stripped
general partners).
202. Williamson, 645 F.2d at 424.
203. See supra Part III.B (discussing RULPA and ability of limited partners to exercise
control over partnership affairs).
204. See Park McGinty, The LimitedLiabilityCompany: OpportunityforSelective Securities Law Deregulation,64 U. CIN. L. REv. 369, 374 (1996) (stating that formal categories
become less useful when they mask substantive economic reality); see also supra Part III (discussing effect of modem partnership statutes).
205. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 145-158 and accompanying text (discussing Simpson).
206. 126 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 1997); see supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text (discussing Steinhardt).
207. See supra notes 154-158 and accompanying text (discussing degree to which partnership agreement curtailed Simpson's power).
208. See Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that
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These cases demonstrate that the words general partnership and limited partnership have lost much of their descriptive value and now are merely labels.
Courts should abandon presumptions based entirely on these labels.
Form-based presumptions are convenient, but they make little sense.20 9
Congress designed the securities laws to provide protection for investors who
lack the ability to protect themselves. 2 0 Focusing on form rather than substance undermines investor protection by providing protection to savvy
entrepreneurs who possess the knowledge to choose the favored form. When
elevating substance over form, it is necessary to determine which factors are
most important. The following section addresses this issue.
B. Modified Williamson Proposal
This Note proposes that courts should disregard formal categories and
adopt a modified Williamson test when determining whether an interest in a
general, limited, or limited liability partnership is a security. The proposed
test adopts the second and third factors from Williamson," modifies Williamson's first factor to eliminate reference to a limited partnership,212 and adds a
fourth factor focusing on the partnership's size. Thus, under this proposed
modified Williamson test, a general, limited, or limited liability partnership
interest might be a security ifthe investor establishes that: (1) the partnership
agreement leaves so little power in the hands of the partner that the partner
limited partnership agreement defined majority of partners as partners holding more than 50%
interest in limited partnership and thus provided Steinhardt with power to approve or disapprove
any material action). With a 98.79% ownership interest, Steinhardt alone constituted a majority
of the partners. Id. See also supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text (discussing power
given to Steinhardt under Limited Partnership Agreement).
209. At least one commentator proposes a "private ordering" approach that would adopt
aper se rule that general partnership interests are not securities. See Ribstein, PrivateOrdering,
supra note 71, at 41-42 (stating that under private ordering approach, general partnerships
would be per se non-securities whether or not partners need protection of securities laws). The
convenience of Professor Ribstein's approach is apparent in that it provides much certainty in
this field of law. Although certainty is an important consideration, it is not the only consideration. Placing so much emphasis on the general partnership label may eviscerate protections
provided by securities law to unwary investors.
210. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (stating
that fundamental purpose of statutes was "to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the
philosophy of caveat emptor"); A.C. Frost & Co. v. Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38,
40 (1941) (stating that purpose of securities law is to protect investors by requiring disclosure).
211. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981) (providing three part
test). Part two ofthe Williamsontest deals with a partner's knowledge or experience concerning
partnership business. Id Part three deals with a partner's reliance or dependence on the unique
entrepreneurial ability of a manager or promoter. Id.
212. See id.(providing in first part of test that partner may be security holder if partnership
agreement distributes power as would limited partnership).
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cannot adequately protect his partnership interest;2" 3 or (2) the partner has so
little knowledge or experience with the partnership's business that he is
incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership powers;2. 4 or (3) the
partner is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability
of the promoter or manager that the partner cannot reasonably replace the
manager or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers; 215 or (4) the
partnership is so large and the partner's interest so small that he effectively
has no influence over essential managerial functions. 216 The following subsections discuss each modified Williamson factor separately.

1. PartnershipAgreement
Part one of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partnership interest might be a security if the investor establishes that the partnership
agreement leaves so little power in the hands of the partner that the partner
cannot adequately protect his partnership interest. Looking to the power given
to partners in the partnership agreement is the logical starting point in a
securities analysis because the partnership agreement provides the law for that
partnership.2" 7 Consider the partnership agreement in Simpson v. Ernst &
213. See BROMBERG &RIBsTEIN, LLPS, supra note 47, at 239 (stating that relevant factor
in securities analysis is whether partnership agreement restricts partners' rights too tightly).
214. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (suggesting that lack of
partner expertise in partnership's business is factor weighing in favor of finding that interest is
security); see also SEC v. Telecom Mktg., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (N.D. Ga. 1995)
(finding that general partnership interests are securities where evidence suggests defendants
targeted investors because of their ignorance of law, accounting, and wireless cable television
industry); Williamson, 645 F.2d at 422-23 (stating that when partner "is so dependent on the
particular expertise of the promoter or manager that he has no reasonable alternative to reliance
on that person, then his partnership powers may be inadequate to protect him from dependence
on others" and therefore implicate securities law); BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, LLPS, supra note
47, at 239 (stating that whether partner's lack of knowledge of partnership's business is too
great is relevant factor in securities analysis).
215. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding
investment contract where investor relied on expertise of promoter to successfully operate
business).
216. See Williamson,645 F.2d at423 (stating that sale of interests to large numbers dilutes
single partner's role to level similar to shareholder in corporation); see also BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, LLPS, supra note 47, at 239 (stating that whether "partners are too numerous" and
whether their "interests are too small" are relevant factors in securities analysis); Chris Walters,
Comment, Application of Investment ContractAnalysis to PartnershipInterest and Dual
Regulation Under Federaland Kansas SecuritiesLaws, 45 KAN. L. REV. 1275, 1291 (1997)
(asserting that large number of partners reduces ability of single partner to influence firm
management).
217. See RUPA (1996) § 103(a) (providing that relations among partners and between
partners and partnership are governed by partnership agreement).
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Young.218 Simpson provides a clear example of a partnership agreement that

would satisfy the first part of the modified Williamson test.
The partnership agreement in Simpson severely restricted Simpson's
power and hampered his ability to protect his partnership interest.2 1 9 Three

key factors support classifying Simpson's partnership interest as a security.
First, the agreement established a very strong centralized management structure in which a management committee exercised exclusive control over the
firm's business and affairs." Generally, using a management committee in
a large firm is not problematic because economic efficiency and administrative feasibility require some centralization ofmanagement. 22 ' But in Simpson,
the Management Committee was a self-perpetuating entity in which members
of the committee appointed its chairman and the chairman, in turn, appointed
its members.' Because partners did not vote for Management Committee
members, the committee was hardly a representative body. Second, the partnership agreement gave Simpson no right to participate in decisions to admit

or discharge new partners.'

This factor is important because admission of

new partners impacts the success of the enterprise and thus supports the
assertion that Simpson relied on others to make essential managerial decisions
that affected the success of the firm. 4 Third, the partnership agreement
curtailed Simpson's right to inspect partnership books and records.' Re218. 100 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 1996). See supranotes 145-158 and accompanying text (discussing Simpson and power held under partnership agreement).
219. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 1996) (discussing
Simpson's lack of power within partnership). According to the trial judge, Simpson had no
authority to (1) participate in admission or discharge of partners, (2) participate in determining
partner compensation, (3)vote for Management Committee members or its chairman, (4) participate in firm profits or losses, (5) examine books and records unless authorized by the Management Committee, (6) sign promissory notes for the firm or pledge, assign, or transfer his
partnership interest, (7) access various client accounts, or (8) participate in annual performance
reviews. Id.
220. See id. at 441 (discussing Ernst & Young's Management Committee).
221. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 163, at 6:60 (stating that
centralization of management is common in large partnerships where there are too many
partners for each to participate effectively in daily decision making).
222. See Simpson, 100 F.3d at441 (discussingErnst& Young'sManagementCommittee).
223. See id. (reiterating trial court's findings of fact).
224. See SECv. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476,482 (9th Cir. 1973) (restating
"efforts of others" test and providing that interest is security where those other than investor
make undeniably significant and essential managerial efforts that affect success of enterprise).
225. See Simpson v. Ernst & Young, 100 F.3d 436, 441 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating that
Simpson had no right to "examine books and records of the firm except to the extent permitted
by the Management Committee"). Under RUPA, a partnership may restrict its partners' rights
to access books and records as long as the restriction is reasonable. RUPA (1996) § 103(b)(2).
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stricting a partner's right to information hampers his ability to protect adequately his partnership interest.
In contrast to the agreement in Simpson, a general or limited liability
partnership agreement that largely adopts the RUPA default provisions easily
satisfies the first part of the modified Williamson test. 2 6 Such a partnership
agreement provides each partner with equal voice in management and unfettered access to partnership information. 2 7 In addition, all partners have to
consent to admitting new partners into the partnership. 28 An interest in this
partnership is probably not a security because a partnership agreement that
gives its partners significant powers provides persuasive evidence that partners are not relying primarily on the efforts of others for their profit. 2 9
Like general and limited liability partnership interests, a limited partnership interest will likely not be a security when the partnership agreement
provides the limited partner with power sufficient to protect his investment. '
One of the most extreme examples of this power is when the partnership
agreement gives a limited partner the right to remove and to replace a general
or managing partner without cause." Such power provides limited partners
with significant control because managers must be responsive to the limited
partners or face removal." 2 In small limited partnerships, removal power is
probably enough to take the limited partnership interests outside securities law
protection. 3 But in large limited partnerships, the right to remove a general
partner becomes attenuated and has little practical effect and thus should not
rule out classification of limited partnership interests as securities." In some
226. See RUPA § 401 (providing default rules regarding partners' rights and duties).
227. See id. § 401(f) (providing that each partner has equal rights in management and
conduct of partnership); see also id. § 403 (providing partner with right to access partnership
books and records and other information concerning partnership's business and affairs).
228. See id. § 401(i) (providing that person may become partner only with consent of all
partners).
229. If a partner does not rely on the efforts of others to obtain profit, his partnership

interest is not an investment contract and, thus, not a security. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (announcing investment contract test and including "efforts of
others" prong).
230. See Steinhardt Group Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 154 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that
partnership agreement provided limited partner with pervasive control over partnership

management and determining that limited partnership interest was not security). For an in-depth
discussion of Steinhardt,see supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
231. See 3 BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, PARTNERSHIP, supra note 163, at 12:147 (discussing
effects of limited partner's right to exercise control).
232.
233.
234.

Id
See id. (discussing removal power and its effect on securities law analysis).
See id. at 12:147-48 (discussing effect of removal power in large firms).
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cases, limited partners are so reliant on the managing partner that removal,
even if authorized by the partnership agreement, is not a realistic option."5
In those cases, removal power should not preclude securities law protection."'
2. Partner'sKnowledge andExpertise
Part two of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partnership interest might be a security if the investor can establish that the partner
has so little knowledge or experience with the partnership's business that he
is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership powers. To some
extent, the powers provided to a partner in the partnership agreement mean
very little if the partner lacks the sophistication to use those powers."
Consider, for example, a lawyer who is a general partner in two separate
partnerships. One partnership is a law firm in which the partner and his
colleagues perform legal services. The efforts of others generate a portion of
the partner's profits, but assuming the partner has sufficient voice and access
to information, he is probably not a security holder. His expertise as a lawyer
provides him with the knowledge and ability to evaluate adequately and to
exercise some control over his investment. 8 In the second partnership, the
partner is one of several professionals who purchased an interest in a wireless
cable television business. 9 He has no intention of actively participating in
the management or operation of the business but merely expects to fund
partially a startup venture with the expectation of future profits. He also lacks
knowledge of the cable television industry and has none of the necessary
equipment to perform the required work. Even though his interest is called a
general partnership interest, in economic reality it is an investment, and federal securities laws should protect it.24

235. See id. (discussing effect of removal right where limited partners depend on special
expertise of managing partner).
236. Id.
237. See SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1946) (placing emphasis on
fact that partners lacked equipment or knowledge to successfully operate citrus groves).
238. See id. at 300 (suggesting that lack of partner expertise in partnership's business is
factor weighing in favor of finding that interest is security); see also SEC v. Telecom Mktg.,
Inc., 888 F. Supp. 1160, 1166 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (finding that general partnership interests were
securities where partnership agreement indicated that partners possessed real power, but evidence suggested that defendants targeted investors because of their ignorance of law, accounting, and wireless cable television industry).
239. See generallyTelecom Mktg., 888 F. Supp. 1160 (involving securities fraud violations
and finding that general partnership interests in wireless cable television business are securities).
240. See id. at 1166 (finding that similar general partnership interest was security when
investors lacked knowledge and equipment to successfully operate partnership's business).
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The wireless cable television example above demonstrates that courts

must look not only to the investor's general business acumen, but also to the
investor's knowledge ofthe partnership's particular business-especially when
the partnership's business is highly specialized. InBaileyv.J. WK Properties,
Inc.,241 the court's decision turned on the specialized nature of the investment.242 Bailey involved a cattle crossbreeding venture in which the investors
purchased cattle embryos from the promoter and the promoter agreed to raise
and to market the resulting calves.243 The court decided that the plaintiffs'
interests were investment contracts because practical limitations hindered the
plaintiffs' ability to protect their investments. First, although the agreements
gave the investors significant powers,2" the investors lacked the technical
knowledge needed to successfully operate the business.245 Second, an economies of scale problem existed in that no single investor owned enough cattle to
make crossbreeding profitable.246 Thus, the investors' dependence on each
other and on the promoter limited the investors' ability to protect their investment. The court, therefore, found that the investors' interests were securities.247
241. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990).
242. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding
investment contract when lack of expertise of plaintiffs in cattle crossbreeding venture imposed
practical limitations on plaintiffs' ability to protect their interests). In Bailey, the plaintiffs
invested in a cattle crossbreeding program in which the plaintiffs bought embryos from the
promoter and the promoter agreed to raise the resulting calves and to market them as they
matured. Id.at 919. Although no formal partnership agreement existed, the court apparently
considered the "Purchase Agreement" and the "Management Contract" together as a singlejoint
venture, and thus applied a Williamson-type analysis focusing on investor sophistication and
reliance on the promoter (parts two and three of the Williamson test). Id. at 924-25. The two
agreements purportedly gave the investors significant control over the investment, but the court
stated that "limiting the examination to the contract itself would provide an easy loophole
through which sellers could circumvent federal securities law." Id. at 920, 922 n.6. The court
based its decisioif that the interests were securities on two practical limitations. First, the
plaintiffs had no experience in selecting embryos and had an extremely limited range of alternative sources of information. Id. at 924. Second, economies of scale prevented an individual
investor from running a successful breeding operation and required the investors to pool their
herds. Id. Based on the plaintiffs' lack of sophistication concerning cattle crossbreeding and
their reliance on the promoter, the court found that the plaintiffs' interests were investment
contracts and thus securities. Id. at 925.
243. Id.at919.
244. See id.at 920 & n.4 (discussing plaintiffs' "substantial rights" and providing language
from "Management Contract"). The investors' substantial rights included the right to direct the
promoter's activities, to choose embryos, to terminate the management agreement, and to direct
the sale of herds. Id. at 920.
245. See id. at 924 (stating that investors lacked expertise to make embryo selections and
had limited access to other sources of information).
246. See id. at 924-25 (noting that case is similar to Howey in that program required
participation of other investors with centralized coordination by promoter).
247. Id. at 925.
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The investors' lack of expertise made them dependent on the promoter. This
dependence is demonstrative of the interrelatedness between parts two and
three of the modified Williamson test.
3. Partner'sDependence
Part three of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partnership interest might be a security if the investor can establish that the partner
is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the
promoter or manager that he cannot reasonably replace the manager or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers. Note that this phrasing is
slightly different than the test that Williamson originally stated.24 The Williamson court did not include the word "reasonably" in its test,249 but elsewhere in its opinion the court indicated that the words "cannot replace" should
be construed broadly." In discussing part three of its test, the court stated
that the investors must allege that they were "incapable, within reasonable
limits," of replacing the promoter." Such language indicates that the court
intended its test to be interpreted realistically rather than rigidly. Thus, this
Note inserts the word "reasonably" into its modified Williamson test. 2
Consider the facts in Bailey v. J W.K Properties,Inc. 3 The investors
in Bailey had the actual power to remove the promoter, but lacked the knowledge or expertise to operate the business effectively. A rigid application of
part three of Williamson would have removed the protection of the securities
lawsY 4 The Bailey court, however, recognized that although the investors
had the power to remove the promoter, they could not reasonably replace
him because of his special expertise and his knowledge of cattle crossbreeding. 5
248. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 424 (5th Cir. 1981) (providing part three
of test and not including word "reasonably"). Part three of the original Williamson test stated
that an interest might be a security if the partner is so dependent on the manager that "he cannot
replace" him or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id.at 425 (stating that plaintiffs must allege that partners were "incapable, within
reasonable limits, of finding a replacement manager").
251. Ia
252. See supranote 215 and accompanying text (stating part three ofmodified Williamson
test); see also Sobel, supra note 49, at 1349-51 (arguing for nonliteral interpretation of part
three of Williamson and suggestihg use of word "practically").
253. 904 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1990). See supra note 242 (providing facts and result in
Bailey).
254. See Bailey v. J.W.K. Properties, Inc., 904 F.2d 918, 920 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that
investors had power to terminate management agreement).
255. See id. at 925 (stating that under circumstances, investors could not meaningfully
exercise rights "theoretically available to them").
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4. PartnershipSize
Part four of the proposed modified Williamson test states that a partnership interest might be a security if the investor can establish that the partnership is so large and the partner's interest is so small that he effectively has no
influence over essential managerial functions. Although it did not include this
factor in its test, the Williamson court recognized that firm size may be a factor
in an investment contract analysis. 6 According to the Williamson court, at
some point a partnership becomes so large that a partner's vote is more like
a shareholder's vote in a corporation. As the number of partners in a partnership increases, each partner's vote becomes very attenuated, thus causing
partners to rely substantially on others to make managerial decisions. 7 This
implicates Howey's "efforts of others" test and suggests that the partners'
interests are securities.
C. GeneralComments ConcerningTreatment ofLimited Liability
PartnershipInterests
No federal courts have addressed the treatment of LLP interests under
federal securities law. Surprisingly, commentators have written very little
concerning this topic. The consensus among those broaching the issue is that
courts should treat LLP interests like general partnership interests because
LLPs are simply general partnerships that elect to obtain limited liability for
their partners. 8 But the freedom of contract provided in modem partnership
256. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that "at some
point there would be so many partners that a partnership vote would be more like a corporate
vote, each partner's role having been diluted to the level of a single shareholder in a corporation"); see also SECv. Telecom Mktg., Inc., 888 F. Supp 1160, 1166 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (suggesting that large number of partners dilutes power such that no partner can exercise meaningful
partnership control); BROMBERG & RiBsTEIN, LLPS,supranote 47, at 239 (stating that number
of partners is factor to consider when determining whether partnership interest is security);
Walters, supranote 216, at 1291 (1997) (stating that large number of partners decreases ability
of single partner to influence operation of essential managerial functions).
257. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at 423 (stating that sale of interests to large numbers dilutes
single partner's role to level similar to shareholder in corporation); Walters, supra note 216, at
1291 (asserting that large number of partners reduces ability of single partner to influence firm
management).
258. See BROMBERG & RIBsTEIN, LLPs, supra note 47, at 236-37 (suggesting that LLP
interests should notbe differentiated from general partnership interests for purposes ofinvestment
contract analysis); see also Larry E. Ribstein, PossibleFuturesfor UnincorporatedFirms,64
U. IN. L. REv. 319,347-50 (1996) [hereinafter Ribstein, Futures](discussing treatment ofLLC
and LLP interests under securities law and suggesting that LLP interests should be non-securities because LLPs operate under default partnership rule ofequalmember participation); George
G. Yearsich et al.,SecuritiesLawAspects ofPartnerships,LLCs, andLLPs, SB85 A.L.I.-A.B.A.
813, 861-62 (1997) (suggesting that courts will likely treat LLPs like general partnerships).
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law makes such categorical grouping based entirely on form an inappropriate
classification. 9 With the addition of limited personal liability, one could
fashion a partnership agreement that makes an LLP more analogous to a
closely held corporation than to a traditional general partnership.
As with general and limited partnership interests, deciding whether an
LLP interest is a security should depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case. Some might suggest that the mere presence of limited liability
creates a presumption that securities law ought to apply. Clearly, limited
personal liability may encourage partners to take a less active role in managingpartnership affairs, thus leadingto centralization ofmanagement- a factor
in investment contract analysis. ° It is true that limited personal liability may
have an impact on a partner's conduct with respect to the partnership, but it
is the partner's conduct - whether he has the power and ability to protect his
interest- that should factor into the securities analysis, not the mere presence
or absence of limited liability.
Some might suggest that courts should treat LLPs and limited liability
companies (LLCs) similarly because they are both unincorporated limited
liability entities. This argument has merit because LLP and LLC enabling
statutes provide enough flexibility so that the two entities may sometimes
appear functionally equivalent.26 ' However, this same flexibility permits
entrepreneurs to create LLPs and LLCs that are drastically different.262 Thus,
a strict comparison to LLCs is also not appropriate. The ability to alter
significantly entity attributes undermines categorical form-based classifications and counsels for fact-sensitive case-by-case analysis.
V Conclusion
In analyzing whether a partnership interest is a security, courts apply the
investment contract test announced in Howey and its progeny.263 Generally,
a partnership interest is a security if an expectation exists that profits will
derive primarily or substantially from the efforts of others." In applying
259. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing features of RUPA and RULPA that permit
flexibility and blur distinctions between business forms).
260. See Walters, supra note 216, at 1292 (discussing structure of management as factor

in investment contract analysis).
261. See generallyRibstein, Futures,supra note 258 (providing discussion of differences
and similarities between LLPs and LLCs).
262. See id.at 321-27 (discussing differences between LLPs and LLCs).
263. See supraPart II.A (discussing development and interpretation of Howey's "efforts
of others" test).
264. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (discussing liberal interpretation of
"efforts of others" test).
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Howey's test, courts developed presumptions that general partnership interests
are not securities and that limited partnership interests are securities.26
Modem partnership law removes the foundation upon which courts based
these presumptions.266 RUPA permits the partnership agreement to change or
to eliminate most of the default partnership rules thereby creating partners that
have little or no power to participate meaningfully in firm management.267
RULPA permits limited partners to become more active in firm management
without sacrificing limited liability.268 Formal categories now mask economic
realities and diminish the appropriateness of form-based distinctions.
This Note proposes that with regard to general, limited, and limited
liability partnerships, courts should diminish the importance of formal categories when conducting an investment contract analysis. In doing so, courts
should apply the proposed modified Williamson test as discussed above in Part
IV. Under the modified Williamson test, a general, limited, or limited liability
partnership interest might be a security if the investor can establish that:
(1) the partnership agreement leaves so little power in the hands ofthe partner
that the partner cannot adequately protect his interest in the partnership, or
(2) the partner has so little knowledge or experience with the partnership's
business that he is incapable of intelligently exercising his partnership powers,
or (3) the partner is so dependent on some unique entrepreneurial or managerial ability of the promoter or manager that he cannot reasonably replace the
manager or otherwise exercise meaningful partnership powers, or (4) the
partnership is so large and the partner's interest is so small that he effectively
has no influence over essential managerial functions.269 By implementing this
test and by placing economic substance over formal categories, courts can
more readily achieve the purposes of federal securities law.

265. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 422 (5th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that general
partnership interests presumptively are not securities); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 640-41
(9th Cir. 1980) (suggesting that limited partnership interests presumptively are securities).
266. See supra Parts III.A-B (discussing flexibility of RUPA and RULPA).
267. See RUPA (1996) § 103(a) (providing general rule that partnership agreement may
modify or eliminate default rules provided in RUPA). See supra Part III.A for detailed discussion of freedom to contract provided in RUPA.
268. See supra Part II.B (discussing changes in limited partnership law that allow limited
partners to exercise control over partnership affairs without incurring personal liability).
269. See supra Part IV.B (discussing application of modified Williamson test).
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